Cash for Karzai in suitcases, backpacks, and grocery bags

Good old Uncle Moneybags is back, but this time his sacks are filled with American money for distribution to cronies and warlords.  From the Wall Street Journal yesterday:

Karzai Confirms Accepting CIA Cash Monthly for 10 Years

By JUHANA ROSSI in Helsinki and YAROSLAV TROFIMOV in Kabul

Afghan President Hamid Karzai on Monday acknowledged that his office has been receiving money from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency over the past 10 years, dismissing the monthly cash payments as a “small amount.”

Mr. Karzai addressed the issue after the New York Times reported on Sunday that the CIA has made tens of millions of dollars in secret payments, often cash packed in shopping bags, as it sought to maintain influence over Afghanistan’s mercurial leader.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai, here in Brussels last week, Monday confirmed that his government has been receiving CIA money for a decade, but dismissed it as a ‘small amount.’

“Yes, the office of the national security has been receiving support from the United States for the past 10 years,” Mr. Karzai told reporters at a news briefing in Helsinki, Finland, responding to a question about whether he has received CIA cash. “Monthly. Not a big amount. A small amount which has been used for various purposes.”

The CIA declined to comment on the matter.

Mr. Karzai, who is touring Northern Europe, made the remarks following his meeting with Finnish President Sauli Niinisto.

The U.S. isn’t the only country to supply the Afghan presidential palace with secret money. In 2010, Mr. Karzai acknowledged receiving bags full of euros from the government of Iran.

Afghan officials have said that these secret funds have been used by the president to reward supporters and buy loyalty from tribal leaders…

Time to take a second look at the proposal to cease foreign aid in Afghanistan?  Or is that still considered “a bit dramatic“?

By the way, if a U.S. company did what a federal agency has done by transferring money to Karzai, that company would be prosecuted under the anti-bribery provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

Money Jihad has previously covered the money that Hamid Karzai received from Iran here.

Taliban doles out Rs 150 million in funding

Freelance journalist Syed Shoaib Hasan reports that the Muraqaba shura, a council of regional Taliban and Al Qaeda faction leaders, routinely distributes millions of rupees to affiliated terrorist tribal organizations at two to six week intervals.  In an example from May of 2012, the shura disbursed 70 million to the Pakistani Taliban, Rs 50 million to another Taliban faction, between RS 30 and 40 to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and smaller amounts to Harkat ul-Mujahideen and Jaish Mohammad.

In his piece, Hasan also analyzes the history of financing militancy in Afghanistan and Pakistan since 9/11.  He argues that forcing front charities to register with the government actually worsened matters by giving terrorists the patina of legitimacy and access to the international financial system.

Complicating the fight against terrorist financing is the militants’ new tendency to steer donations to small trusts affiliated with mosques rather than madrassas, which is more difficult to track.  Hasan reveals that one in three mosques in Karachi admits to funding militants.

Hat tip to Sal and Colby Adams for sending this over via Twitter.  From Money Matters magazine:

The militant economy

The slush funds accumulated by the militants were fed into the global financial system and were fed into the global financial system and were used to buy legimate businesses involved in construction, shipping and transport. Revenues from these concerns are now fuelling the insurgency

By Syed Shoaib Hasan

On a bright May afternoon in 2012, five men with assault rifles strode into a two-storeyed building near the bazaar in Miramshah. All wore their hair long and oiled under their Chitrali hats but the rangy frame, the narrow, aquiline nose and deep-set eyes instantly betrayed Zulfiqar alias Hakimullah Mehsud, ameer of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. An hour later the coterie emerged, with a staggering Rs70 million in cash.

The money was Mehsud’s share from a fund administered by the Taliban’s Shura-e-Muraqibat (Council of Common Interest), ostensibly an oversight committee that handles matters related to various militant groups headquartered in the tribal areas. (While some western news agencies have described it as an Al Qaeda-formed and managed entity, the shura is clearly of Taliban origin and character.) But managing and distributing funds from the Afghan Taliban structure – ‘the emirate’, as it is referred to in militant circles – is one of its primary functions.

Disbursed at two- to six-week intervals, these funds comprise the largest chunk of revenues for all militant groups in the tribal region – barring the Arab Al Qaeda – and, for some, are the only source. That May, other than the TTP, the Taliban factions headed by Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Mullah Nazir got Rs50 million each while the former Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, now known as the Islamic Movement of Turkestan, got between Rs30 million and Rs40 million. Other recipients of these stipends from the emirate include the Taliban faction of Omar Khalid as well as splinter factions of the Harkatul Mujahideen and Jaish-e-Mohammad and the Takfeeri Group of the Lashkar-e-Taiba. (Some analysts believe that the TTP also funnels money from its share to the Punjabi Taliban.)

The money is to cover the operational costs of militancy. The bulk of it is, of course, spent on arms and ammo. The rest is distributed over transport costs; communications equipment (including satellite and cellular phones as well as walkie talkies) and – in an interesting sign of the times – media cells. (The Afghan Taliban themselves, for example, have a 100-plus dedicated media cell staff that operates a website available in five languages and manages high-tech studios with editing facilities.) Besides this, small amounts are also made available for the ‘shuhuda fund’, which enables payments between Rs5,000 to Rs10,000 for the families of the successful suicide bombers.

The 9/11 shift

The role of the emirate in funding is relatively new. Before 9/11, most militant groups operating in the Af-Pak region drew funds from two main sources: the Pakistani and Middle Eastern Islamic states and large and small private donors. From the times of the Afghan war till about the nineties, say militants, the size of this pie was around $6 billion. Historically, as much as two-thirds came from the states, with Saudi Arabia leading with contributions that went up to 50 percent of total funding. Close on the kingdom’s heels were Iraq and the Gulf Arab states.

Post 9/11, the situation changed. The US-led crackdown on militant groups began with the now-famous ‘follow the money’ directive and the US Patriot Act of 2001. As a result, funds from state sources all but dried up. As the world and Pakistan woke up to the abuse of hundi and hawala – the traditional trust-based system of money transfer in vogue for money transfer to militant organisations as well as conventional Islamic charities – private donations also disappeared.

Over the next 18 months, the flow of money to militant groups ebbed to an all-time low. The period coincided with the time militant operations were at decade-long nadir and many in Pakistan were quick to call it the ‘end of jihad’ in the region. That could well have happened – without funding, the militants could not have continued undermining the US-dubbed ‘War on Terror’. But a loophole emerged – inadvertently provided by the Pakistani authorities themselves, as they looked to close down all non-formal avenues for money transfer.

A better mousetrap

In their bid to screen all ‘suspicious’ transactions, the authorities hit many Islamic charities and some individuals suspected of transferring funds for militant operations. While a few were involved – the Al Akhtar Trust, for example – most were simply what they said they were: welfare organizations and people working primarily among the urban and rural poor. Accordingly, after a thorough examination of their sources of funding, these groups and individuals were allowed to continue their activities.

However, in order to distinguish them from the militant groups, the charities were required to register themselves and maintain bank accounts for financial transactions. This ensured that only those who had valid ID cards issued by the then newly instituted National Database Authority (Nadra) could open bank accounts. Further, the move also ensured that even where occasional hawala transactions were used, the monies did eventually cross banking lanes and were thus documented. The final salvo was the provision of a list of proscribed organizations – the Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi and Tehreek-e-Jafria Pakistan, among others – to the State Bank of Pakistan, which was to make sure their accounts were frozen.

At the time, this may have seemed a leak-proof system, especially to western observers. But in a corrupt third world bureaucracy, there were more holes in this ‘fool-proof’ mechanism than Swiss cheese.

Step up and identify yourself

For starters, the basis of the system – the newly introduced CNIC – could easily be subverted.

Pakistani money funds terrorist bonuses

Improvised explosive attacks on U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan earn the jihadists between $100 to $1,000 apiece, money which originates from Pakistan’s ISI service and other sources, according to a recent Time magazine report entitled “Afghanistan’s IED Complex: Inside the Taliban Bombmaking Industry.”  The whole article is here (h/t Sal Imburgia); a couple key excerpts follow:

“The enemy has ISI money, narcotics money, and other sources,” says Sediq Sediqqi, the spokesperson for the Afghan Ministry of Interior, referring to Pakistan’s intelligence service. “We need to be able to counter their investments”…

Locals in Panjwai claim the Taliban have also turned to subcontracting, so far a trademark of the coalition side of the war. The insurgents supply the explosives, they say, but unemployed youth plant them for cash. If they blow up an Afghan police vehicle, they get anything between 10,000 and 20,000 Pakistani rupees ($100-$200). If they blow up a coalition vehicle, the reward is as high as 100,000 Pakistani rupees. The claim is difficult to prove. But there does exist an internal Taliban bonus structure for operatives carrying out IEDs successfully. Mullah Kalam said he has gotten up to 20,000 PKR for blowing up U.S. vehicles, and 10,000 PKR for Afghan police vehicles. “We definitely have a bonus, a sweetener,” Kalam says.

The ability to pay extra to successful attackers is different from the method used by Al Qaeda in Iraq, which employed a flat wage structure according to a recent study (h/t Paul Gill). Incentive pay in Afghanistan suggests that the Taliban either has extra funds to provide bonuses, or that they want to reward the most ardent fighters and are prepared to expend their money accordingly.  The comment by the Afghan Interior Ministry spokesman supports the former.

How king of hawala funds Taliban’s terror

Haji Khairullah links heroin kingpins, jihadists, and hawala dealers in an “iron triangle” of terrorist financing according to U.S. and Afghan investigators quoted in a recent Reuters article.

Khairullah, who was blacklisted with sanctions from the U.S. Treasury Department last summer for his role in funding the Taliban, is the chief of a multi-million dollar hawala business spanning from Pakistan to Dubai.

Hawala is a traditional Muslim method of transferring cash that is difficult to detect or interdict, making it an ideal money service solution to Islamists.

The whole article is worth a read for the context it provides into the overlap between conventional business activities and terrorist financing in Afghanistan.  Here are just some of the most salient passages:

…The hunt for Khairullah’s presumed millions points to the sheer difficulty of choking Taliban funding channels.

Investigators who venture into the region’s forbidding ecosystem of illicit commerce find that lines between legitimate trade and criminality often blur, hand-written ledgers are barely decipherable, and deceptively nondescript offices move mountains of cash.

“Everything is done on a phone call and a handshake,” said one U.S. official. “The record system or the paper trail that allow you to connect the dots is not as clear as the Western system.”

In Kandahar’s seven-storey money market, where turbaned dealers haggle over bricks of well-worn notes, Khairullah’s colleagues leapt to the defense of a respected member of their age-old fraternity.

“When we went to his office, we only saw people changing money or drinking tea or eating sweets,” said Haji Qandi Agha, a regal-looking trader who is the market’s president. “There was no talk of the Taliban or heroin.”

Agha gestured to a man with a close-cropped beard and embroidered skull cap who had just approached his counter.

“For example, this man is sending money,” he said, after the customer produced a sheaf of grubby bills from his waistcoat. “What if the government or America captures him and says he’s Taliban? Is it my crime?”

The man, counting with deft thumbs, did not look up…

Current and former officials ascribe Khairullah’s wealth to… Afghanistan’s burgeoning heroin trade.

“He is one of the biggest fish in the region,” said General Khodaidad (who goes by one name), Afghanistan’s counter-narcotics minister from 2007 to 2010.

A source in Pakistan’s Anti-Narcotics Force also said Khairullah was suspected of involvement in trafficking. “He is rich and resourceful, therefore no one can touch him,” he said…

Investigators suspect Khairullah stands at the centre of an “iron triangle” locking hawala dealers, heroin kingpins and militants into an increasingly profitable symbiosis.

Taliban commanders would collect opium from poppy growers, then hand it over at his shops in farming communities in return for instant payments, a Western official said.

“He would take opium and give you cash,” he said.

Ten biggest terror finance news stories of 2012

1. Taliban funding remains intact despite international sanctions
   Reports in 2012 revealed that the Taliban’s funding remains intact, that none of the Taliban’s assets have been blocked by U.S. sanctions, that the Taliban retains its taxing authority over Afghans, and that the UN sanctions only 18 percent of the Taliban’s provincial shadow governors in Afghanistan.
2. Islamic charities remain top terror financiers
   It’s questionable to even call this “news,” but understanding the role of Muslim charities in funding jihad, of which we saw multiple examples throughout 2012, is the Rosetta stone to bankrupting terrorism.  Instances of Muslim charities behaving badly cropped up, and in some cases have worsened, in both in the Middle East and in the West this year.In the Islamic world, the Saudi charitable foundation IIRO, whose branches in Indonesia and the Philippines were previously blacklisted by the U.S. for funding terrorism, is opening seven new branch offices.  In Bangladesh, the chief of the terrorist organization Jamatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) revealed that Muslim Aid, WAMY, the Muslim World League, the Qatari Charitable Society, and the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society, are among the primary donors to his jihad. 

Another global giveaway to subsidize sharia

The Asian Development Bank will promote sharia finance with a $750,000 handout to Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan—countries with Islamic bank structures that are already well-entrenched.

Keep in mind that the World Bank also has a program to promote sharia-compliant finance in concert with the Islamic Development Bank, a sponsor of the Muslim Brotherhood.  From Reuters on Dec. 11:

Islamic banking expansion aided by ADB grant

KUALA LUMPUR, Dec 11 (Reuters) – The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has provided a $750,000 grant to promote Islamic banking in Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan.

The money will be shared between those countries’ governments to help their banking systems to meet regulatory standards set by the Islamic Financial Services Board, the ADB said.

Islamic finance follows religious guidelines such as a ban on the payment of interest and on pure monetary speculation.

Its core markets are in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, with about 57 percent of total global Islamic banking assets held by the 20 largest Islamic banks, concentrated in Malaysia, Saudia Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar and Turkey.

The ADB, which promotes economic and social progress in the Asia-Pacific region, said that the expansion of Islamic finance in other countries in the region will provide large numbers of people with banking services for the first time.

A report by Ernst & Young on Monday said that up to 150 new financial institutions could be established to cater for growing demand from the Muslim-majority populations of countries such as Indonesia, Egypt and Pakistan.

The sharia finance sector in Bangladesh has been documented to fund terrorism.  Giving even more money to their Islamic banking system makes no sense unless the purpose is to bankroll terrorism even further.

ADB is funded by its member countries and international bond sales.  Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, Nomura, Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, BNP Paribas, Citigroup, Daiwa, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, RBC Capital Markets and UBS were involved with an ADB bond issuance earlier this year.

Afghan mining deal could fund terror

Taliban may tax supply routes

A business deal for copper mining rights at Aynak in Afghanistan by a Chinese consortium poses the risk of inadvertently funding local conflict and increasing the likelihood of extortion by armed groups, according to a November report from the human rights organization, Global Witness.

Excerpts from Witness’s report on the secret Aynak contract follow (with internal citations omitted):

The development of the mine and associated infrastructure brings with it a host of valuable supply and sub-contracts.  The international aid experience over the past ten years has shown that, without appropriate safeguards, the management of such supply and sub-contract can end up inadvertently funding conflict.  Aynak is a high-profile target for attacks which could be aimed at gaining attention or extorting money…

The risk of off-budget gains by, for example, security forces or powerbrokers controlling supply routes also needs to be guarded against.  [In the Democratic Republic of Congo] they do this by imposing illegal taxes at mine sites and along transportation routes, or by confiscating and trading minerals directly.  Companies sourcing minerals from the DRC are now required to carry out due diligence to ensure that their mineral purchases do not contribute to conflict or human rights abuses.

In the Afghan context, where conflict is ongoing and mines have traditionally played a role in providing financing to armed groups, supply chain due diligence by companies is an important step.

Indeed, given the Taliban’s history of profiting from flawed subcontracting measures and by levying taxes dictated by sharia law, including Taliban taxes on the mining sector (see here and here), the importance of forestalling Taliban infiltration in the Afghan-Chinese supply chain cannot be overstated.

Islamic law imposes a zakat tax of 20 percent (also known as khums) on rikaz, which Islamists regard as any source of wealth discovered underground, including oil, minerals, and buried treasure (Sahih Bukhari 2.24.575).

U.S. names multi-million dollar Taliban hawaladar

In RadicalIslam.org’s interview with Money Jihad, we discussed how poorly the U.S. has handled the scourge of hawala, the traditional Islamic method of transferring money.

The Bush administration talked about hawala, but wasn’t able to accomplish much to stop the opaque money swapping method that is often used to fund terrorism.  The Obama administration has been worse, passing up a golden opportunity to seek a maximum penalty against the hawala dealer who funded the failed Times Square bomber.

The latest news that the Treasury Department has sanctioned a hawala business with branches in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran that has transferred millions of dollars for the Taliban is somewhat encouraging.  We’ve always known that these cases exist, but normally we don’t even hear about them because of diplomatic sensitivities with Pakistan.  The fact that the feds would go public with this information is a step in the right direction.

But in practical terms, the sanctions are largely symbolic.  As Treasury’s press release said, “As a result of today’s action, all property in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons in which Rahat Ltd, Mohammed Qasim, and Musa Kalim have an interest is blocked, and U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in transactions with them.”

That is, unless Rahat maintains an account a U.S. bank, it is unlikely that any funds will be frozen as a result of this action.

As long as we have troops on the ground in Afghanistan, it would be somewhat more effective to treat the Afghan branch of Rahat Ltd as a military target:  raid the branch, detain and interrogate its employees, and confiscate its records.  There’s more intelligence to be gathered about the Taliban’s financials.

Here are the basics we know from Treasury:

Treasury Imposes Sanctions on a Hawala and Two Individuals Linked to the Taliban

11/20/2012
WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury today announced the designation of Rahat Ltd, a hawala, and two individuals pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224. Rahat Ltd has branches in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran which have been used by the Taliban to facilitate their illicit financial activities. The Treasury Department is also designating the owner of Rahat Ltd, Mohammed Qasim, and the owner and manager of its Quetta, Pakistan branch, Musa Kalim.

Rahat Ltd has been used extensively by senior Taliban leadership to finance their violent activities. This includes facilitating millions of dollars of transactions to support the Taliban shadow governor for Helmand Province, United Nations Security Council 1988-Listed Naim Barich, who was also designated November 15, 2012 pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act for his extensive narcotics production and distribution activities.

“Today’s action demonstrates our continued efforts to target and disrupt financial activity linked to the Taliban’s use of hawalas,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. “We will continue exposing these illicit networks and deprive the Taliban of their sources of funding no matter where they turn.”

As a result of today’s action, all property in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons in which Rahat Ltd, Mohammed Qasim, and Musa Kalim have an interest is blocked, and U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in transactions with them.

Rahat Ltd

Rahat Ltd is a hawala that facilitates financial activities for the Taliban.  Taliban shadow governor for Helmand Province Barich provides funds through Rahat Ltd to subordinate Taliban commanders to plan and conduct operations in southern Afghanistan.  As of mid-2012, Barich had transferred money using the Quetta branch of Rahat Ltd.  As of early 2012, Barich had received millions of dollars through the Quetta branch of Rahat Ltd and had provided a senior Taliban commander with over $250,000 via Rahat Ltd.

Other senior Taliban figures regularly used Rahat Ltd to store and transfer hundreds of thousands of dollars.  As of early 2012, approximately $500,000 of Taliban funds had been placed in the Quetta branch of Rahat Ltd and, as of late 2011, a senior Taliban member arranged the transfer of over $100,000 through the same Rahat Ltd hawala.

Mohammed Qasim

Mohammed Qasim owns Rahat Ltd and, as of mid-2012, was a hawaladar for Taliban senior leadership.  As of mid-2011, Qasim used his hawalas in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran to facilitate Taliban financial transfers.  As of early 2011, Qasim was a financial assistant to Taliban shadow governor for Helmand Province Barich.  Additionally, in early 2012, Qasim helped to transport weapons and ammunition for the Taliban and, as of mid-2011, frequently smuggled weapons into Helmand Province for the Taliban.

Musa Kalim

Musa Kalim owns and runs the Quetta, Pakistan branch of Rahat Ltd, also known as the New Chagai Trading Company and the Musa Kalim Hawala.

As of late 2012, Taliban shadow governor for Helmand Province Barich had used Kalim to move and hold his finances.  As of late 2011, the bulk of Kalim’s hawala business consisted of transferring Taliban and smugglers’ funds.  Kalim also managed the transfer of funds from donors in the Gulf to support Taliban fighters in 2011…

IMU money man tapped Europe, Turkey

The U.S. Treasury Department has sanctioned Qari Ayyub Bashir for his role as a financier for the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and probably Al Qaeda, too.  The designation prohibits Americans from doing business with Bashir, and freezes any assets Bashir has in U.S. banks.

The designation also gives us more insight into where the IMU is accessing funds.  Rather than the typical Gulf sources of Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E., Qari Bashir is said to have collected money from Europe and Turkey prior to transferring it to a man described as “a financial facilitator for Al Qaeda.”

From The Long War Journal on Oct. 18:

…Treasury described Bashir as being the “head of finance” for the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan as well as a member of the group’s shura, or executive council. In this role, he provides financial and “logistical” support for IMU operations in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, and fundraises from outside the region.

“Bashir received funds from sources in Turkey and elsewhere in Europe and delivered these funds” to Fazal Rahim, an IMU facilitator who was designated by the US as a terrorist in September 2011 and is thought to be in Pakistani custody. Rahim was also described as a “financial facilitator for al Qaeda” [see LWJ report, US adds 5 al Qaeda, Taliban, Haqqani Network, and IMU facilitators to terrorist list].

Prior to taking on the role of chief financier for the IMU in 2010, Bashir “led attacks against Afghan police in Kunduz Province, Afghanistan, and recruited IMU fighters at his madrassa in Pakistan.” Additionally he helped IMU recruits reach their units and commanded “an anti-Coalition militia” in the Afghan provinces of Kunduz and Takhar.

Bashir is an Uzbek national and is based out of Mir Ali, in Pakistan’s Taliban-controlled tribal agency of North Waziristan. Mir Ali is known to host the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and several other local and foreign terror groups.

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan is a key ally of al Qaeda and the Taliban, and supports operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as plots attacks in Europe. The IMU is known to fight alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan and has integrated into the Taliban’s shadow government in the north. [For more information on the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, see LWJ reports, IMU cleric urges Pakistanis to continue sheltering jihadis in Waziristan, and IMU announces death of emir, names new leader.]…

Peace in our time… if the price is right

The Taliban is willing to accept truce with the government of Afghanistan contingent on the replacement of U.S. military presence with U.S. “economic assistance,” according to a report published this month describing interviews of Taliban leaders conducted by the Royal United Services Institute.

Can you imagine the pain that the 9/11 victims’ families would endure if their tax dollars were spent on foreign aid to a Karzai-Taliban coalition government?  It is outrageous that our government would even consider negotiations under terms floated in the RUSI interviews.

UN sanctions only 6 of 34 Taliban governors

The Taliban has powerful shadow governors overseeing operations in nearly every province in Afghanistan.  But the UN-imposed asset freeze, travel ban, and arms embargo against the Afghan terrorist group excludes dozens of these Taliban governors from international sanctions.

A new report from the UN’s Taliban sanctions monitoring team indicates that at least six, but no more than 11 Taliban provincial governors, are blacklisted under UN Resolution 1988—the 2011 resolution that separated the Taliban and Al Qaeda sanctions lists.  At least 42 individuals are known to be serving or have served as provincial governors in the past year.

The monitoring team recommends that the UN security council consider sanctioning these individuals, saying “it would seem logical to add the missing names.”

The report notes that the provincial governors often move across borders, and applying the travel ban would help increase pressure against them.

Although the UN report received ample media coverage for its analysis of the Taliban’s revenues, the revelation that so few Taliban governors are sanctioned was totally overlooked by the news wire services.  Reuters didn’t mention the recommendation, the Associated Press focused on sanctions as a negotiation tactic, and Agence France Presse focused on Taliban fundraising.

Hat tip to Twitter user El Grillo for sending a link to the text of the UN report.