Archive for April, 2013


Rivers of fake money flow into India

April 19, 2013

A flood of counterfeit notes from Dubai, Pakistan, Jammu and Kashmir, Nepal, Bangladesh, and to some extent from Sri Lanka have left Indians swimming in a pool of devalued rupees.

The fake Indian currency note crisis is benefiting terrorist organizations such as Hizbul Mujahideen and Dawood Ibrahim’s D-Gang with backing from the Pakistani ISI spy service.  Profits from counterfeiting help militants buy weapons.

There seems to be a new story from Indian media every two weeks or so documenting the surging problem.  Here’s the latest from the Times of India, which illustrates both the J&K and Bangladeshi points of ingress for bogus bills, and the jihadist beneficiaries:

NIA files charges against 3 for raising terror funds for Hizbul Mujahideen

TNN Apr 12, 2013

NEW DELHI: The National Investigation Agency (NIA) has filed charge sheet against three more persons, including a Bangladeshi national, for allegedly raising terror fund for the banned outfit Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) through circulation of fake Indian currency notes (FICN) in Jammu & Kashmir.

The charge sheet against the three accused Badal Sheikh and Fayaz Ahmed (both Indians) and Shafiq-ul (Bangladeshi) was filed in the NIA Special Court in Jammu under various sections of the Ranbir Penal Code and the central anti-terror Act on Wednesday.

The Court subsequently issued a non-bailable warrant against absconding Shafiq-ul who was key point person of the Indian accused for supplying FICN through a trans-border cattle smuggler – Badal Sheikh — of West Bengal’s Malda district.

Earlier, the probe agency had filed charge sheet against five persons in the case, alleging that the accused used to procure and supply high quality FICN from Bangladesh and smuggle it into Jammu & Kashmir for raising funds for the terror group.

The five who were charge sheeted earlier include two HM members – Mubarak Ahmed Bhat and Shafaqat Mohiudding Kuchey – and Badal Sheikh.

The NIA in its charge sheet claimed that HM operatives had first contacted Badal who, in turn, approached the Bangladeshi national for procurement of FICN.

“Fayaz Ahmed Rather – a notorious FICN smuggler – started getting high quality fake Indian currency notes from Malda and circulate it in Jammu & Kashmir,” said the NIA.

It’s interesting to note the cattle rustling connection in this story.  The black market in cows, which are revered and illegal to export from India, is a growing area for illicit trade along the border of India and Bangladesh.


Money jihad news: recommended reading

April 18, 2013
  • Cyber attacks are often treated as technology news. But now it’s more about bucks than bits… more>>
  • So generous of Venezuela to have given a diplomatic passport Hezbollah agent Ghazi Nasr al Din . How many more operatives like him are immune from baggage searches at customs?  More>>
  • You’re a kidnapped Filipino, and your government won’t pay for your ransom. Why your government is right… more>>
  • The Palestinian Authority denies paying salaries to terrorists in Israeli prisons.  I beg to disagree, says prisoner’s wife… more>>
  • Are the FARC and Al Qaeda partnering in a cocaine-for-cash and weapons trade? And you thought cash-for-clunkers was bad… more>>

Word of the week: soft loan

April 17, 2013

Among the hundreds of requests for zakat or other financial assistance that Money Jihad has received from overseas spammers, a couple have involved requests for a “soft loan.”

In June 2011 through our “Contact us” page, Wisnu Wibowo wrote, “Asalamualaikum… I hope someone can help with soft loan” purportedly to keep him out of jail for a $2,000 debt.  Borrowing from Peter to pay Paul, it would seem.

In January of this year, somebody named Krisna Busana Karya also contacted Money Jihad demanding “grants or soft loan” with a five year term to help with an oyster cultivation business with an eye toward a growing market in Jakarta.  Tempting offer, Krisna, but no thanks.

What is a “soft loan”?

A soft loan is defined as “A loan made on terms lower than or more favourable to the borrower than regular commercial terms”.*

Soft loans are repaid with interest, but it may be at a smaller interest rate or payable over a longer term than conventional loans.  Since interest is involved, soft loans are not sharia-compliant.

Nevertheless, extending a soft loan to a borrower who cannot meet conventional terms suggests that the lender is taking on risk in excess of what the capital markets normally bear.  Therefore, soft loans are somewhat similar to sharia finance in that both deviate from fair market interest rates.  Soft loans, like sharia loans, come with strings attached, such as concessions made by the borrower.

People do not lend for free.  Reduce or eliminate interest rates, and lenders will come up with ways of recouping the costs through fees or other methods.  Is “ethical finance” truly ethical when the actual cost of borrowing is obscured by fees and special conditions, rather than a transparent, market-based interest rate that is known to both parties?

* Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, Glossary of Terms for Agricultural Insurance and Rural Finance (Rome:  FAO, 1992).


Mumbai: bank robberies and bitcoin fund terror

April 16, 2013

The Indian Mujahideen have been using bank robberies to finance their activities according to a former high-ranking law enforcement official.  D. Sivanandhan is also concerned about bitcoin’s role in funding militants, but it should be noted that no evidence or data are included in this news report:

Banks looted to finance terrorism: Security expert

Mumbai, April 11 (IANS) Bit coin and crypto currencies are becoming major avenues for money laundering and terror groups often rob banks for funding terrorist acts, a top security expert said.

“Investigations have revealed that the hijackers of the Indian Airlines IC-814 had looted a bank three months before the (Kandahar) hijack, which helped them finance the entire terror operations,” said former Maharashtra director general of police and security expert D. Sivanandhan.

Similarly, the terror outfit Indian Mujahideen has also been allegedly involved in several bank robberies to finance its operations, Sivanandhan said at a conference — ‘Leveraging Innovative Security Solutions for Banks and Financial Institutions’ — that concluded here late Wednesday…

See related Money Jihad coverage of bank robberies for jihad here, here, and here, and background on the Indian Mujahideen’s financial activities, which include hawala and extortion, here.


Smuggling cash with foreign prepaid cards

April 15, 2013

ACAMS is reporting that while know-your-customer requirements and other safeguards are in place to prevent abuse of prepaid, reloadable cards obtained from American financial institutions, the freedom of foreign banks to issue such cards remains a potential area of terror finance vulnerability.

Here is an excerpt from’s featured article by Colby Adams on Apr. 9:

…Final rules issued by the U.S. Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) in July 2011 imposed anti-money laundering (AML) program duties on American providers and sellers of certain prepaid products, including customer identification, suspicious activity reporting and transactional recordkeeping requirements.

But reloadable cards that can be acquired in person or over the Internet from foreign financial institutions remain an immediate threat to the United States, according to a senior compliance officer at a major U.S. financial institution linked to the prepaid industry.

“The rules are way too focused on what’s leaving the United States—on bulk cash smuggling on a card,” said the person, who spoke on condition of anonymity. “The giant elephant in the room is that the regulators aren’t checking what’s coming here, and that could mean trouble sooner rather than later.”

In such a scenario, a member of a terrorist organization living in a high-risk jurisdiction could purchase a network branded prepaid card from a non-U.S. bank with little trouble. Should the person travel to the United States, he or she could use the card to withdrawal money from any one of thousands of ATMs, or receive additional funds from another foreign-issued prepaid card holder

Why would Muhammad Atta need a SunTrust account if he could have just brought a preloaded payment card with him from Hamburg?  Especially when that card is branded with the familiar logo of Visa or Mastercard, such as this product being offered on the website of Cyprus-based Hellenic Bank:

Screenshot of foreign p-card promising anonymity and a Visa logo

So much for know-your-customer provisions when a bank in the EU is encouraging customer anonymity.  Moreover, Mr. Adams notes that “the Visa logo means that it can be used anywhere Visa is accepted – including ATMs.”


Canadian subsidiary invests in genocidal Sudan

April 14, 2013

Despite Sudanese state sponsorship of terrorism and its campaign of massacres by Arab Muslims against black Muslims and Christians, a Vancouver-based firm, Statesman Resources, has an African subsidiary that maintains an oil exploration concession in the Sudan.

This information comes from Jonathan Schanzer of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.  Schanzer points out that although he believes such investment is legal, it is totally out-of-step with Western expectations about refraining doing business with the Sudanese:

Why is the West Doing Business with Sudan?

Jonathan Schanzer
5th April 2013 – National Post

What does Canada have in common with the regime in Sudan, which perpetrated genocide in Darfur, while allying with Iran and providing weapons to the Palestinian terror group Hamas?

In practical terms, they share very little. Ottawa withholds commercial support services and government-to-government development co-operation from Sudan. Canada’s parliament also has enforced sanctions mandated by the United Nations Security Council, including an arms embargo, as well as an asset freeze and travel ban on certain individuals.

Yet, somehow, it is legal for Canadian firms to invest in Sudan’s oil sector.

Just consider Vancouver-based Statesman Resources. The company owns 50.1% of an African subsidiary, Statesman Africa. In July 2012, Statesman Africa was awarded 75% of an oil exploration area known as “Block 14” in northwest Sudan, along Egypt’s southern border.

Preliminary estimates by Statesman Africa indicated that the block might have a “mean potential resource of 600 million barrels.” By November 2012, Block 14’s prospects looked even brighter. One estimate suggested that it held “1.5 billion barrels of gross un-risked prospective resources.”

According to the Associated Press, as of December 2012, Statesman Africa was “in the process of being formally registered in Sudan and opening an operational office in Khartoum.” According to the company’s CEO, Sudan’s state oil company, Sudapet, is “essentially … a joint venture partner.” Statesman must also work with Sudan’s Ministry of Petroleum, which is the regulatory authority.

To be clear, there is nothing illegal about Statesman’s investment in Sudan. Canadian companies are apparently free to do business with Khartoum. But in doing so, they are out of step with Canada’s otherwise sensible foreign policies in the Middle East.

Sudan, as noted above, is a patron of Hamas. It allows the group’s leaders to fundraise and train on Sudanese soil. It also was the origin point for Iranian-made Fajr 5 long-range rockets that were smuggled into Gaza and subsequently fired into Israel during the conflict in November 2012. This was not the first time Sudan helped Iran smuggle weapons into Gaza, either.

Canada has properly listed Hamas under its criminal code. There are severe penalties for “persons and organizations that deal in the property or finances of a listed entity. In addition, it is a crime to knowingly participate in, or contribute to, any activity of a listed entity for the purpose of enhancing the ability of the entity to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity.”

Yet, somehow, it is legal to engage in business with Hamas’ patron, Sudan.

Sudan serves as an important hub for Iran’s terrorist training, financial investments, and the distribution of Iranian weapons to jihadi groups across the African continent. Canada has placed strong sanctions on Iran for its global terrorist activity and its pursuit of an illicit nuclear program. Yet, somehow, it is legal to engage in business with Iran’s close ally, Sudan.

This dissonance appears to be rooted in Canada’s focus on Sudan’s civil conflict, rather than its foreign policies. As one official government website notes, “Improved bilateral relations between Canada and Sudan are contingent on the Government of Sudan’s willingness to take steps toward maintaining a peaceful relationship with the Republic of South Sudan and its other neighbors, ending the current violence in Darfur and the transitional areas, and improving the overall human rights situation across the country.”

The United States, by contrast, lists Sudan as a State Sponsor of Terror. Khartoum earned this distinction in 1993 by allowing al-Qaeda to create its headquarters in the country during the 1990s. However, it remains on the list now for its close and continuing ties to both Iran and Hamas…

Read it all here.

By the way, Ken Rijock also advises entities doing business with Sudanese companies to obtain written assurances from them that their goods and services aren’t benefiting end users in Iran.  Statesman Resources wouldn’t want to run afoul of Canada’s sanctions on Iran by engaging in slipshod business practices in Sudan, would they?


India: hawala is 30 percent of terror revenues

April 12, 2013

Hawala, the traditional Islamic system of transferring money and debts, is essentially outlawed in India.  However, the practice, which is difficult to trace and lends itself well to illicit financial activity, is still commonplace.  A recent article in the news website asserts that 10 percent of all such hawala transactions in India go toward funding terrorism, and that 30 percent of terrorists’ money comes from hawala.  Much of it is transferred from the Gulf (including Dubai) to Kerala, a hotspot for terror finance.

Time to revisit hawala policy?  Money Jihad thinks so.

H/t to Bob Connors.

Crores being pumped into India by ISI to finance terror

Apr. 1, 2013

In almost every hawala deal, 10 per cent of the amount goes towards terror funding, reports Vicky Nanjappa  

A sharp rise in the number of terror financing cases in 2012 in India is an indicator to how well terror groups have channelized their resources.

According to the Financial Intelligence Unit, in 2009, the number of terror financing cases was recorded at 200 but rose to 1,400 cases in 2012.

The FIU report states that the Inter-Services Intelligence in Pakistan manages to raise Rs 1,800 crore annually to fund terrorist activities especially against India. Today, the Intelligence units say that the amount has shot up to Rs 2,400 crore, as the intensity of their programme against India too is expected to see a rise.

In the past, the ISI adopted to circulating fake Indian currency, ensuring that a certain amount of money through hawala transactions, extortions and drug trade was handed over to them.

As per the latest FIU report, there have been 1,444 cases of terror financing last year. In 2011 the figures were 428 cases and in 2010 it was 316.

Sources in the Intelligence Bureau say that out of the 1,444 cases, almost 65 per cent are related to fake currency.

Last year, around 3,20,000 fake notes of Rs 500 and Rs 1,000 denominations were found, while the year before that around 2,50,000 notes were found.

Sources say that while fake currency accounted for a major chunk of terror financing, hawala transactions accounted for at least 30 per cent. In almost every hawala deal, 10 per cent of the amount goes towards terror funding. The biggest hawala transactions have been from the Gulf to Kerala. Proof of such transactions being used for terror related activities was found during the 2006 train bombings in which an amount of Rs 4.5 lakh was exchanged to carry out the attack.

The Indian Mujahideen in particular has a dedicated network through which it collects money in Delhi. The money is wired from Gulf to Kerala and then to New Delhi…


Backstabbed: How Iraq helps Iran skirt sanctions

April 11, 2013

Nobody has been as good at tracking the painful truth of Iraqi-facilitated evasion of international sanctions on Iran as financial crime consultant Kenneth Rijock.  Consider:

  • The Kurds in northern Iraq have “allowed both rampant money laundering, and widespread facilitation of global Iran sanctions evasion” though their banks. In central Iraq, U.S. dollars are flowing in bulk from Baghdad to Iranmore>>
  • Lebanese banks and Bank Melli, a sanctioned Iranian bank, are operating in northern Iraq.  EU and North American businesses that use Lebanese banks may not be taking sufficient steps to prevent their transactions from benefiting Iranian end-users… more>>
  • “Iraq blatantly disregards UN sanctions on Iran” in accepting an Iranian-flagged vessel‘s shipment at its Um Qasr port, for example… more>>
  • Five Turkish banks in Iraq may be facilitating Iran’s sanction dodging behavior… more>>
  • Iran will reap $16 billion annually from a new natural gas deal with Iraq… more>>

Reading about the dangerous anti-money laundering (AML) and combating the financing of terrorism (CFT) policies of Iraq may be upsetting to those who have made personal sacrifices fighting for Iraqi freedom, but we have to face the current facts.  How does Rijock describe the Iraq invasion?  “Military success, yes; but AML/CFT utter failure.”


Saudi charity workers on trial for funding terror

April 10, 2013

Officials from a Saudi Islamic charity are on trial in an ongoing, multi-defendant prosecution in Riyadh.  The Arab News is calling them members of the “Haramain Cell.”

The Saudi-based Al Haramain Islamic Foundation has been under international scrutiny since 9/11 for its role in financing terrorism around the world.  Its Oregon branch was shut down by federal authorities and its leader was convicted in 2010.  Its Saudi parent organization was said to have been rolled “along with several other charities, into a new government-run National Commission for Relief and Charity Work Abroad.”

Saudi investigators and prosecutors have provided cover for the Haramain Cell charity workers by claiming that they were “misusing” their positions through fraud and “using the names of reputable people as alibis.”  Money Jihad has no doubt that “reputable people” were actually involved, and the Saudis have concocted the story of “misuse” as a public relations favor for their own elites.  This case represents willful continuity, not an accidental deviation, from Haramain’s longstanding jihadist patronage.

Defendants have also been charged with arming militants in Iraq.  From Arab News via Maktoob on Mar. 27:

Trial of terror suspects continues

A terror suspect is on trial in a special court in Riyadh for allegedly planning to set up a weapons factory to supply militants in Iraq and for opening an office in China to carry out his logistical operations.

“Defendant No.12 collaborated with Abu Mustafa Al-Iraqi to manufacture SAM 7 missiles while he was in Afghanistan,” said representative of the Bureau of Investigation and Public Prosecution (BIPP) during the court hearing on Sunday.

The BIP also charged defendant No. 8, affiliated to the terror cell known as the Haramain Cell, with misusing his position as the chairman of a leading charity fund in the Kingdom to enable Al-Qaeda operatives to infiltrate the fund’s ranks and divert its revenue to finance terror operations inside and outside the Kingdom.

“Even after defendant No. 8 was informed officially of the decision to shut down the charity organization and freeze its account, he went against the court’s ruling by fraudulently investing the charity’s funds in militant activities, using the names of reputable people as alibis,” the BIP official said during his court appeal.

The BIP added that defendant No. 8 invested SR 751.8 million [approximately 200 million USD], belonging to the charity to buy property, including two large buildings, at 45 locations in various provinces in the Kingdom. Moreover the investment returns from the property plots were channeled into financing terror activities, the BIP source said.

The suspect was also accused of using one of the charity’s properties to construct a water desalination factory at the cost of SR 4 million, which was placed under his son’s ownership.

Eleven of the 22 members of the Haramain Cell appeared in court on Sunday, Al-Hayat daily reported.

The suspects face charges of working in tandem with eight terror organizations including Al-Qaeda, Jamaat Abu Yusuf and Usba Al-Ansar.

Defendant No. 1 is accused of assisting certain terror organizations financially with SR8.4 million, including transferring SR2.2 million to a Saudi detained in a Lebanese jail for links with a Lebanese-based terror outfit.

Meanwhile, defendant No. 2, who holds a doctoral degree, has been charged with planning terrorist attacks in the Kingdom, in coordination with Al-Qaeda. The suspect has also been accused of contacting a number of members from Al-Qaeda as well as meeting and recruiting representatives from various terror organizations during Haj and Umrah seasons.

Charges against defendant No.7 include misappropriating the charity’s funds as well as supporting terror activities in the Kingdom.


Sheltering the ill-gotten gains of Dawood Ibrahim

April 9, 2013

Dawood Ibrahim, the second wealthiest terrorist ever, and his criminal D-Gang syndicate sit atop a multi-billion empire.  Much of that wealth has been offshored to the Nassau branch of Bank of Baroda in the Bahamas, according to new investigative reporting.

Firms in Dubai have served as the intermediaries for Ibrahim to transfer funds from Pakistan through the United Arab Emirates to secondary tax havens.  Ibrahim is able to get away with his terrorist operations and criminal financial activities because 1) he is basically supported and shielded by the government of Pakistan, and 2) Dubai can facilitate just about any illicit transaction you can imagine.

The Bank of Baroda has denied the allegations.

Thanks to Shreekant Sahu for sending us a link to this excellent article from the India-based news website Firstpost:

Dawood Ibrahim’s blood-money washes up in Nassau

Twenty years after he paid for the bombs which tore through Mumbai in 1993, killing 257 people, organised crime kingpin Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar’s cash has begun washing up on the shores of Nassau island – known for its perfect beaches, perfect weather, and zero-tax, high-secrecy banking. Ibrahim, a Firstpost investigation has found, has emerged as the principal provider of financial services to narcotics traffickers and jihadists across South Asia – a business pegged at over $3.5 billion a year, which uses front companies to access the global financial system.

Ibrahim, transnational crime expert Gretchen Peters says, has become the, “the Goldman Sachs of organised crime. They’re highly transnational, they move billions of dollars annually, and service a wide range of clients from corrupt officials, to drug traffickers to terrorists”.

Last year, highly-placed government sources told Firstpost, the Bank of Baroda’s Nassau branch saw successive wire transfers of several hundred thousand dollars from Dubai-based currency exchanges suspected of laundering organised crime proceeds. The firms, sources have told Firstpost, included the al-Dirham Exchange named in an Indian government dossier on Dawood Ibrahim’s operations.

“From the bank’s point of view”, the source said, “they’re doing nothing illegal, or even wrong. From our point of view, there’s a real concern: whose money is this, and where is it going”? Read the rest of this entry ?


The Taliban’s jihad tax

April 8, 2013

Traditional terror finance analysis has regarded “revolutionary taxation” imposed on businesses and capitalists as a tactic of urban guerrillas such as Basque separatists, and demands for protection payments are commonly associated with the mafia.

But another group is increasingly adopting these techniques in Karachi, Pakistan—the Taliban.

It’s not really new for the Taliban.  (They’ve been extorting money for businessmen and peasants alike for years as zakat for jihad.)  But collecting such money in Karachi represents increased power and autonomy of the Pakistani Taliban, and it’s a trend that must be monitored closely.

This story from the Global Post in February slipped by us somehow:

Pakistan’s ‘Terror Tax’

The Taliban is embracing mafia-style tactics in Pakistan’s wayward port city of Karachi.

KARACHI, Pakistan — In November, armed men from the Pakistani Taliban showed up in front of Ali Hussain’s factory, asking for money in exchange for protection.

But Hussain didn’t have the $100,000 these men wanted.

“Just tell them to go to another factory,” he said to his chief security guard, whom called him on his office phone, as he watched the scene unfold on a security monitor.

Two of them raised their AK-47s toward the tiny camera outside the gate. “You pay us, we protect you. You decide not to give us the money, we’ll kill your only son.”

It’s a scene playing out with ever-greater frequency in some parts of Karachi, Pakistan’s wayward northern port city, as the Taliban embraces mafia-style tactics to help line its pockets.

When four days later, more armed men showed up, Hussain had no other choice but to pay. Before he could hand over the check, he heard the sound of indiscriminate gunfire.

Hussain’s 33-year-old son, the factory’s production manager, was shot. A bullet pierced through his side, ripping apart his spleen and part of his pancreas.

In 2012 alone, police said at least 115 different establishments in Karachi have been victims of what locals now dub the “terror tax.” Many more such incidents may not have been reported to authorities. While other mafia groups are also guilty of such shakedowns in Karachi, the police said the Taliban is one of the worst offenders.

The Pakistani Taliban, also known as Tehrik-i-Taliban, or TTP, is an umbrella group of Islamic militants originating from Pakistan’s northern tribal region. The Pakistani Taliban is not related to the Taliban in Afghanistan, which has a vastly different history and identity.

Just three years ago, it was the Awami National Party (ANP) — a left-wing, secular group affiliated with Pakistan’s large Pashtun population — that controlled the area of Karachi where Hussain’s factory operates. Though ANP-linked men frequently asked small business owners for “protection money,” many businesses were left alone because they already supported the party financially or politically.

These days the Taliban has mostly driven out the ANP. The party’s graffiti and flags, which once plastered neighborhoods here, are gone. Inside mosques, flyers now let worshippers know who is in charge. The flyers instruct businesses in need of protection that the Taliban is available and a satellite phone number is listed.

The Taliban has taken hold of parts of Karachi with disturbing ease, taking advantage of endemic poverty, a corrupt municipal government and a growing immigrant population. Some supporters of the Taliban said the group’s presence has rid the area of immoral activities like drugs and prostitution, making them more popular.

Security analysts worry that — with the Taliban’s growing presence in Karachi — Pakistan’s stores of nuclear weapons and other arms could fall into the wrong hands. Militants attacked a key Karachi naval base in August 2012 that some suspect houses part of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

Bashir Jan, an ANP official in Karachi, said when the Taliban first began operating in the area, the group had little choice but to withdraw.

“At first, we didn’t do anything,” he said. “But then, when our activists were found dead, we began listening.”

With free run of the streets, the Taliban is now cleaning up on its protection rackets.

Akram Mahmoud, a shop owner in northwestern Karachi, said he pays the Taliban about $30 every month. The sum is an entire year’s worth of tuition for his son, who is in elementary school.

Although many businesses report extortion to the Karachi police, rarely do they respond. One Karachi police officer, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said police are hesitant to even enter large parts of northern Karachi.

“If someone is stupid enough to report a crime, the Karachi police simply file a report. Too many security personnel have already died just for walking into these streets,” he said.

City officials and political activists say that to effectively fight the Taliban in Karachi, a strong police force is vital.

“Instead the police sit and cower inside their stations. We need a better solution, a better police force,” said an ANP official.

But police officers insist they are no match for the Taliban…

Read the rest of the article here.  Declaring martial law has been rumored as a possible solution to this problem.